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Abstract
Enforcement of policy is typically delegated. What sort of mission should
the head of an enforcement program be given? When there is more than
one firm being regulated their compliance decisions — otherwise completely
separate — become linked in a way that depends on that mission. Under
some sorts of missions firms compete to avoid the attention of the enforcer by
competitive reductions in the extent of their non-compliance. Under others
the interaction pushes in the opposite direction. We develop a general model
or enforcement spillovers that allows for the ordering of some typical classes
of missions. We find that in plausible settings ‘target-driven’ missions (that
set a hard emissions target and flexible budget) achieve the same outcome
at lower cost than ‘budget-driven’ ones (that fix budget). Inspection of some
fixed fraction of firms is never optimal.
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1 Introduction
The cop can only pull over one car at a time. To avoid a ticket you
don’t have to obey the speed limit - you just have to be going slower
than the guy in the next lane. (Anon, Lifehacker.com (2007)).
The enforcement of government policy is typically delegated. At an aggregate
level, for example, enforcement of environmental legislation is delegated to an en-
vironment agency.1 At the intra-agency level the enforcement of a particular area
of legislation (say noise control) will generally have associated with it a dedicated
enforcement program.
We ask the following question: When establishing such an enforcement program
what mission should be given to the program leader?2
A variety of missions are in common use and our model will be flexible enough
to embody any of them. For the purposes of the initial part of the paper, however,
we will focus attention and discussion around two types. The first type requires
that the enforcer achieve a particular rate of compliance at least cost. We will
refer to such missions as target-driven. The second type (which we will refer to as
budget-driven) requires him achieving the highest possible compliance level subject
to a budget constraint. Both are observed in practice.
It is natural to suppose that the target-driven and budget-driven approaches are
dual to one another and therefore that the choice between them does not matter.3
1More generally crime control is delegated to a police force, tax collection to a revenue service
and so on. We will refer to the ‘enforcer’ as if an individual.
2A lot of attention has been paid to the problems that arise when the interests of the principal
and the delegate (as agent) are imperfectly aligned. Gailmard (2002), Hopenhayn and Lohmann
(1996) are two examples amongst many. These are applications of well-understood principal-
agency problems and we ignore them here. We assume, in other words, that incentives can be
put in place to ensure that the enforcer pursue his mission diligently. Our model fits better in
the delegation as strategic commitment strand of the literature (Spulber and Besanko (1992)).
3By dual we mean that if under a budget-driven mission involving a budget Y leads to a
realized emissions rate X, then specifying X as the target under a target-driven mission would
lead to realized enforcement costs Y. This may explain why scholars setting up economic models of
enforcement have paid little attention to the objective assigned to the enforcer. Between the two
outlined here the most commonly incorporated in theoretical models of enforcement is probably
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We show that in any setting involving more than one firm such a supposition is
wrong. Mission matters.4
The essence of the story we are going to tell is as follows: firms facing a common
enforcer find themselves in a game not just with the enforcer, but with each other.
The nature of that interaction depends critically upon what the enforcer is trying to
achieve (what we refer to as his ‘mission’). This paper analyses the impact of that
strategic interaction on the outcomes and provides a basis for ranking alternative
missions. An important conclusion is that their should be ‘horses for courses’ - the
best mission to assign in a given enforcement setting will depend in predictable
ways upon the nature of the enforcement environment and technology. As such the
paper generates practical policy principles.
1.1 A Motivating Example
To understand the sort of eﬀect that we are looking to focus on in the paper it is
useful to have an example in mind. The story here will not precisely fit the analytic
model presented later, but captures the spirit of what we are trying to do.5
Consider a setting in which there are some fixed number of firms and each makes
a binary decision either to emit or not emit a unit of some forbidden pollutant. Emit
corresponds with ‘violate’, not emit with ‘comply’. The enforcer costlessly observes
the aggregate level of emissions (has an ambient measure of pollution flow) and so
knows how many firms have chosen to violate, but not which ones. Finding that
out - and rectifying it - requires a two stage inspection/enforcement program. First
the enforcer visits firms sequentially. Each visit reveals whether or not that firm
is compliant. If it is not the enforcer exerts some additional time/money/resource
that the enforcer acts to maximimize non-compliance subject to a budget constraint (examples
include Heyes and Rickman (1999), Harrington (1988)). Some also assume a welfare objective (for
example Malik (1990)). Heyes (2000) provides a survey of environmental enforcement models.
4Without providing a formal model Firestone notes this in his admirable study of USEPA
enforcement practices: “An agency’s organizational mission ... may influence how and why the
agency behaves and to what eﬀect. These influences play out not only in the development and
implementation of regulations, but in enforcement decisions as well” (Firestone 2002: 409).
5In the formal model firm’s emissions will be a continuous variable - we will allow for diﬀerent
degrees of non-compliance.
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pursuing the matter - collecting evidence, litigating, administering a fine, returning
the firm to compliance and so on.
Within this setting consider the implications of the alternative missions:
Example 1 A target-driven mission would tell the enforcer to achieve a specified
level of compliance (ensure that no more than k firms are in violation) at least
cost. So the enforcer visits firms — putting violators back into compliance — until
his compliance target is achieved. A decision by one firm (call it firm 1) to violate
increases the chance that a violation by firm 2 will be detected and penalized.6
We say that non-compliance by firm 1 has a positive enforcement spillover on
firm 2. Under standard assumptions this increased risk of detection makes non-
compliance less attractive to firm 2, the compliance decisions of firms are strategic
substitutes.
Example 2 A budget-driven mission would tell the enforcer to minimize non-
compliance subject to a budget constraint. So the agent visits firms at random
- pursuing those that it finds to be in violation - until its enforcement budget is
exhausted. The higher the proportion of inspections that lead to enforcement activ-
ity, the lower the probability that any particular firm will be subject to inspection.
A decision by firm 1 to violate therefore decreases the probability that a violation
by firm 2 will be detected. We say that non-compliance by firm 1 has a negative
enforcement spillover on firm 2. Under standard assumptions this reduced prob-
ability of detection makes non-compliance more attractive to firm 2, so that the
compliance decisions of firms are strategic complements.
In these examples, a switch in mission alters qualitatively the nature of the
strategic interaction amongst the firms, even though the underlying technology of
compliance, inspection and enforcement remains unchanged.
In Example 2 each non-compliant firm benefits from safety in numbers. Others’
non-compliance means that they can be expected to ‘absorb’ more enforcement
6This should be obvious. Suppose the target is to ensure that only k of, say, N firms are left
non-compliant. If there are initially v violators then the probability that any given violator will
be caught is v−kv , which is increasing in v.
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resource, lowering the chance that the enforcer will get around to uncovering its
wrongdoing. In Example 1, on the other hand, there is danger in numbers. The
mission dictates that only a certain number of violators can be left in violation,
so an increase in the number who choose initially to violate reduces the likelihood
that any particular one of them will be one of the lucky ones.7
The existing literature on enforcement has neglected this strategic interaction.
It is universally assumed in the existing literature that the enforcement objective
is fixed. It is also very common to assume that the enforcer is interacting with a
single firm. Either assumption eﬀectively dismisses the issues that we investigate
here.8
Our model can be seen as fitting into the wider set of models in which behavior
is incentivized by rewarding on the basis of relative performance. These include
tournaments (Lazear and Rosen (1981)) and contests (Tullock (1978)). A mission
implicitly embodies a particular structure of expected pay-oﬀs, sensitive to my
performance but also the performance of others, and so puts regulated parties in a
pseudo-tournament situation.
Of course, the precise incentives and interaction generated by alternative mis-
sions depends on the specifics of the enforcement setting. Section 2 develops a
simple model to show how diﬀerences in enforcement spillovers under target-driven
and budget-driven missions aﬀect the regulatory outcome. We acknowledge that
a more general mechanism design formulation could be used to explore the char-
7AOL-Autos has as its number one tip for avoiding a speeding ticket finding a ‘pack’ of
speeding cars to travel in. “If you’re within a pack of cars all going 10 mph over the limit, you’ve
automatically improved your odds of not being the one that gets pulled over for a speeding ticket,
even though you’re all technically speeding. The cop has to pick one car; if you are in a pack of
cars its less likely to be you.” (AOL Autos 2007).
8There are occasional exceptions. That compliance performance of one firm could aﬀect the
enforcement intensity brought to bear upon others has been noted by Lear and Maxwell (1997),
but they do not consider the issue of alternative objective functions. In a diﬀerent setting Erard
and Feinstein (1994) characterize the interdependence of income reporting decisions in an income
tax compliance-enforcement game. Our model develops these themes further, and emphasizes
the fact that the strategic interaction between firms’ compliance choices is conditioned by the
enforcement mission.
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acteristics of an ‘optimal’ mission, whilst not (for reasons of tractability) going
down that route. Section 3 generalizes the argument and derives a criterion to
rank alternative missions according to their eﬃcacy in the presence of enforcement
spillovers. Section 4 concludes.
2 AModel Incorporating Enforcement Spillovers
An enforcer is appointed to control the level of some anti-social activity. For
concreteness, we regard this activity as illegal emission of some pollutant but the
model could relate to almost any anti-social activity. There are N identical firms,
each chooses a level of emissions simultaneously. Firm i’s choice — its emission in
excess of the permissible limit — is given by xi ∈ [0, xˆ]. Here xi is a measure of the
firm’s non-compliance, with xi = 0 denoting complete compliance, and xˆ specifies
some physical limit to the level of non-compliance.
The purpose of enforcement is to influence aggregate pollutant levels. It does
this in two ways. The threat of detection influences pollution choices ex ante, whilst
pollution levels can be pushed down ex post by the enforced abatement activity
that follows prosecution.
Enforcement is costly so there is the usual trade-oﬀ between achieved pollution
levels and enforcement expenditures. As we see below, the terms of this trade-oﬀ
are sensitive to the mission pursued by the enforcer. We assume that the assigned
mission is common knowledge and that the enforcer pursues it diligently.
Each firm finds being clean expensive and faces a cost function c(xi). This
function is continuous and diﬀerentiable and has standard features: c0(xi) < 0 and
c00(xi) > 0. So other things equal each firm would choose a high value of xi.
However, non-compliance carries the risk of prosecution and penalty. That risk
depends upon the enforcement regime and the decisions of other firms.
There are a variety of ways in which we might sensibly model the process of
enforcement (see Heyes (2000) for a survey of the approaches taken in the litera-
ture).
In a particular setting the appropriate approach will depend upon a variety
of aspects of the nature of emissions, the physical environment, mechanics and
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technologies of detection, the policy and legal ‘architecture’, and so on. But we
don’t want to get bogged down in the particularities here - the set-up in this section
is illustrative, the framework in Section 3 is definitive and allows for much more
generality.
For current purposes we assume that enforcement has two stages: the first
involves conducting inspections to identify non-compliers, the second involves pur-
suing/prosecuting firms found to be non-compliant and forcing them back into com-
pliance. Each inspection costs the enforcer φ0. The cost of pursuing/prosecuting a
firm found non-compliant is φ1(x) where φ1(0) = 0 (compliant firms absorb no en-
forcement eﬀort), φ01 > 0 and φ
00
1 < 0. Without providing a micro-level description
of the process of enforcement, we have in mind that the eﬀort required to gener-
ate the evidence for and prosecute a large polluter will exceed that required for a
small polluter.9 Nothing substantive, however, rests on this and we can imagine
situations where φ1 would take other forms. Total enforcement cost for a firm with
non-compliance level xi is, then, given by k(xi) = φ0 + φ1(xi), k0(xi) > 0.
We are going to focus on symmetric outcomes and the relationship between
number of inspections, n, and the average level of non-compliance in the population,
x. If n ≤ N firms are inspected randomly the probability that a particular firm
will be picked for inspection is simply
r(x) =
n(x)
N
, (1)
and we will refer to r(x) as the enforcement risk faced by that representative firm.
If n(x) is increasing in x - so that an increase in non-compliance by other firms
increases the enforcement risk - we say that the enforcement spillover is positive.10
If n(x) is decreasing in x - so that an increase in non-compliance by other firms
decreases the enforcement risk - we say that the enforcement spillover is negative.
9Penalties for large violators are bigger than those facing small (we will introduce a penalty
function below) and it may be that the court would set a higher standard on the quality of
evidence that it requires, or that the larger violator would engage in more obfuscation than its
smaller couterpart. Further, recall that φ1 incorporates the cost of putting the violator back into
compliance and this might reasonably be thought to be increasing in the amount of ‘movement’
needed.
10For tractability, we treat n as a continuous variable. This saves mess.
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A firm found to be in violation has to pay a fine and undertake whatever abate-
ment activity is needed to return to compliance. The costs to the firm associated
with these are captured in a single, composite ‘penalty’ function p(x).11 We will
make the standard assumptions that p(0) = 0 whilst p(x) > 0; p0(x) > 0 and
p00(x) > 0, ∀x > 0.
As usual an individual firm’s choice involves a trade-oﬀ between the costs of
compliance c(xi) and the expected penalty r(x)p(xi) from non-compliance. But
importantly a particular firm’s point of view the risk of any non-compliance be-
ing penalized varies with the choices of other firms. As we focus on symmetric
equilibria, we use (xi, x−i) ∈ R2+ to denote the configuration where firm i chooses
xi and all firms other than i choose the identical value x−i. Let r(xi, x−i) denote
the enforcement risk associated with this configuration. So firm i chooses xi to
minimize
V (xi, x−i) = c(xi) + r(xi, x−i)p(xi), (2)
taking x−i, the (symmetric) choice of other firms as given. Letting V1 and V2 denote
the partial derivatives of this function with respect to xi and x−i respectively, an
interior minimum must satisfy
V1(xi, x−i) ≡ c0(xi) + p0(xi)r(xi, x−i) + p(xi)
∂r
∂xi
(xi, x−i) = 0.
12 (3)
This implicitly defines a ‘reaction function’, Ri(x−i), which tells firm i’s optimal
response to x−i.13 At a symmetric Nash equilibrium x∗ = {x∗, x∗, . . . x∗}, we have
V1(x
∗, x∗) = 0 :
c0(x∗) + p0(x∗)r(x∗, x∗) + p(x∗)
∂r
∂xi
(x∗, x∗) = 0. (4)
11This might also capture reputational or so-called ‘market losses’, or any other costs to a firm
being found in violation of the regulation.
12The associated second-order condition for a minima is V11(xi, x−i) > 0 and we restrict atten-
tion to cases where that is met.
13Whether firms’s choices are strategic substitutes or complements, in the sense of Bulow,
Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985), depends on the sign of the cross-partial V12. It is easy to
show that choices are strategic substitutes if V12 > 0, and strategic complements if V12 < 0.
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The equilibrium will be unique and ‘stable’ if the absolute value of the slope of the
reaction function is less than 1.14
Clearly, there exists a wide range of models of compliance, with ad hoc assump-
tions about the objective function of the enforcer, that are consistent with the
above enforcement setting. What we want to do now is explore the relationship
between enforcement mission and outcomes and identify the characteristics of a
“good” enforcement mission.
2.1 Target-driven mission
Suppose, first, that the enforcer is asked to get aggregate emissions down to some
level τ > 0. The aggregate level of pollution in any symmetric equilibrium is
given by Nx. So if this exceeds τ , the enforcer must prosecute enough firms to
reduce the total level of pollution to τ . Since each prosecution brings a firm back
into compliance and reduces pollution by an amount x, the required reduction in
aggregate pollution, Nx− τ necessitates
nt(x; τ) =
Nx− τ
x
(5)
inspections (we use the superscript t to denote that the target-setting mission is in
play). At any symmetric outcome xi = x−i = x, the probability of inspection for
any particular firm is
rt(xi, x−i; τ) =
Nx− τ
Nx
(6)
if Nx ≥ τ , and zero otherwise. Using rt1 and rt2 to denote the partial derivatives of
this enforcement risk with respect to xi and x−i we have
rt1 =
τ
(Nx)2
> 0, (7)
and rt2 = (N − 1)rt1 > 0.
The last relation describes the nature of the spillover for this mission. From the
perspective of firm i, an increase in non-compliance by other firms increases average
14For this we require that |V12| < |V11| which corresponds to the standard stability assumption
routinely made in models of this sort.
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non-compliance. This compels the enforcer to increase the number of inspections in
order to preserve the target τ . In terms of our earlier terminology, the enforcement
spillover is positive. In a two firm setting, for example, an increase in violation
by firm A increases the enforcement risk faced by firm B and makes violation less
attractive to the latter.
Under conditions that are easy to specify each firm’s optimal choice is well-
defined.15 The unique symmetric equilibrium under this mission can be represented
as (xt, xt), where xt satisfies
c0(xt) + p0(xt)rt(xt, xt) + p(xt)rt1(x
t, xt) = 0. (8)
Note that the equilibrium outcome varies with τ , so that we have xt = xt(τ). It is
easy to verify that xt is increasing in τ . In words, a less stringent target leads to
an increase in the ex ante rate of non-compliance.16
2.2 Budget-driven mission
Consider an alternative mission in which the enforcer is given a fixed budget β > 0
and told to get the level of pollution as low as possible subject to that budget
constraint.17
Once again, consider a symmetric outcome. Given the average level of non-
compliance x = x at this outcome, the budget can finance at most
nb(x,β) =
β
k(x)
(9)
15For the optimal choice to be a minimum, it is suﬃcient that the elasticity of the penalty
function exceeds 1N at the relevant point. Firms’ choices are strategic substitutes if the elasticity
of the penalty function at exceed 2N at any symmetric outcome. Details are in the Appendix.
16We have to distinguish between ex ante non-compliance, the level defined by this first-order
condition, and the ex post non-compliance that will prevail after the enforcement program has
run its course and some subset of violators have been pushed back into compliance by regulatory
eﬀort. The ex post rate of compliance here will be τ .
17To keep things interesting we assume that the budget is binding - in other words that in-
specting all firms is not feasible. Analytically β < Nk(0).
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inspections (and resulting pursuits/prosecutions). The implied probability of pros-
ecution at this symmetric outcome is
rb(xi, x−i) =
β
Nk(x)
. (10)
The partial derivatives of this function are given by
rb1 = −
βk0(x)
[Nk(x)]2
< 0 (11)
and rb2 = (N − 1)rb1 < 0. Again this second term is of interest. An increase in
non-compliance by other firms increases the average level of non-compliance. Why
is this so? Recall that prosecution cost is increasing in x, so the increased expected
burden-per-inspection on the enforcer’s limited enforcement budget results in a
reduction in the expected number of inspections. With this budget-driven mission,
the enforcement spillover is negative. In a two firm setting, for example, an increase
in violation by firm A makes violation more attractive to firm B.
Once again, under moderate conditions, each firm’s optimal response is given by
well-behaved reaction functions. The firm’s choices can be described by a reaction
function (which is well-behaved under moderate conditions - see Appendix) and are
strategic complements if the elasticity of the penalty function is suﬃciently high.
The symmetric equilibrium under this mission, (xb, xb), must satisfy
c0(xb) + p0(xb)rb(xb, xb) + p(xb)
∂rb
∂x
(xb, xb) = 0. (12)
The equilibrium outcome in this case depends on the enforcement budget. It is
straight-forward to verify that xb(β) is decreasing in β, so that a higher enforcement
budget achieves greater ex ante compliance.
2.3 Comparing outcomes
How do the equilibria under these two missions compare in terms of compliance
decisions and enforcement expenditure? Note that outcomes xt(τ) and xb(β) vary
with the chosen target τ and budget β respectively, so that any comparison makes
sense only for suitably calibrated pairs of values of these parameters.
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One possible approach may be to choose values of these parameters so that
the two alternative missions are somehow similar in terms of their enforcement
pressure. Such calibration is not straightforward because the enforcement pressure
functions also varies with firms’ choices, which may diﬀer across missions.
Consider an arbitrary budget-driven mission (b, β) and an arbitrary target-
driven one (t, τ). Suppose under the former mission, the symmetric outcome xb(β)
obtains with nb(xb,β) prosecutions. We ask the following question: does there
exists a value of τ (call it τ ∗) which, if set under target-driven mission (t, τ) results
in precisely nb(xb,β) prosecutions when firms choose xb(β)? For ranges of (xb,β)
where such τ ∗ can be found, we have a functional relationship τ ∗(β), with
rt(xb, τ ∗(β)) ≡ rb(xb,β). (13)
The central question is, how does the outcome xt(τ ∗) under mission (t, τ ∗(β)) com-
pare with that under mission (b,β)? We have the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Let xb(β) denote the outcome under budget-driven mission (b,β).
The same outcome can be achieved at lower enforcement cost under an appropriately
calibrated target-driven mission (t, τ).
A formal proof is provided in the Appendix, but a comparison of (8) and (12)
is suggestive. The two missions diﬀer in the nature of the enforcement externality.
The target-driven mission generates a positive enforcement spillover which serves
to enhance the incentive impact of any particular level of enforcement pressure. A
budget-driven mission dilutes incentives, so ends up with higher realized enforce-
ment costs for any particular compliance outcome.
3 A Generalization
While this comparison in the last Section illustrated the significance of enforcement
spillovers for outcomes, the analysis was limited by the specificity of the missions
and the particularities of the enforcement setting and the missions considered.
Our aim in this Section is to make things much more general, and to establish as a
12
general result what we have just noted by example - namely that a ‘good’ mission
in a particular setting will be one that generates, when interacted with the other
elements of that setting, positive enforcement externalities.
As above we consider an enforcer with a mission to control the level of some anti-
social activity. There are N identical firms and again each firm’s non-compliance
choice is denoted by a real-valued variable xi ∈ [0, xˆ]. Aggregate non-compliance is
given by the N-dimensional vector x = {x1, x2, . . . , xN}. The purpose of enforce-
ment is to influence x.
The enforcer is issued with a mission to pursue. We consider any mission of
the form (M,μ), where M describes any broad objective and μ is a real-valued
parameter associated with that objective. To relate this to the missions compared
in the previous section, M might refer to ‘maximize compliance with given en-
forcement budget’, or ‘minimize enforcement cost of achieving some target level
of compliance’, while μ is the assigned target level or allocated budget. Going
beyond those missions M might, for example, call for inspecting a fixed fraction
μ of the population of firms. It might also be capture some hybrid version of the
target-driven/budget-driven cases, with a parameter capturing the ‘softness’ of the
budget constraint.
As before firms face a choice between spending on compliance and the risk of
being penalized for non-compliance. The enforcement environment faced by each
firm can be described by an enforcement pressure function, which captures the
probability that non-compliance will be detected and penalized. This depends on
the mission in place (as well as the behavior of other firms). For firm i, write the
enforcement pressure function under mission (M,μ) as:
rMi (xi,x−i; μ).
In this formulation, the enforcement pressure on the firm depends on its own choice
xi but also on x−i, the vector of choices made by the N − 1 other firms. We make
no prior assumption about the eﬀect of changes in x−i, as this can diﬀer across
missions. A mission generates negative spillovers if the enforcement pressure on
13
firm i is decreasing in another firm’s — call it firm j — level of non-compliance:
∂rMi
∂xj
< 0.
The opposite sign describes a positive spillover.
We restrict attention again to symmetric cases, allowing us to drop the firm-
specific subscript (so that rMi = r
M
j = r
M). Two, that the eﬀect of individual
compliance choices on the enforcement pressure function is symmetric across firms
(so that ∂r
M
∂xi
= ∂r
M
∂xj
for all i and j.) The latter assumption is natural in envi-
ronments where, as in the previous section, individual choices aﬀect enforcement
intensity through the average level of non-compliance. Lastly, the enforcement
pressure function is assumed to be smooth and diﬀerentiable.
First consider an individual firm’s choices in such enforcement environments.
The firm aims to maximize expected profits, given by a function of the form
π(xi, rM(xi,x−i)). (14)
As greater enforcement intensity is associated with higher expected value of finan-
cial penalties, we assume this function is decreasing in its second argument, r. Each
firm’s profit varies with other firms’ choices because of enforcement spillovers.18
To study the strategic interaction in firms’ compliance choices, we make the
standard assumption that firms choose their own compliance choices taking other
firms’ choices as given and consider symmetric Nash equilibria in the level of non-
compliance. Define W (xi, x−i) as the profit function for the typical firm when it
chooses xi and all other firms make a symmetric choice x−i.19 As defined, W is a
function of just two arguments, the firm’s own choice xi and the symmetric choice
x−i made by other firms. We consider a firm’s profit-maximizing choice of xi given
any arbitrary x−i, focusing on environments in which the optimal choice is interior.
Let W1 andW2 denote the partial derivatives of the profit function with respect to
18In order to focus on the regulatory spillover, we abstract from any other linkages between
firms. We do not, for example, consider the possibility that firms might interact in an imperfectly
competitive product market such that they might have incentive to ‘raise rivals costs’ (Salop and
Scheﬀman (1983)).
19That is, with a slight abuse of notation, we have x−i = {x−i, x−i, . . . x−i}.
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these arguments. An interior solution must satisfy the first-order condition:
W1(xi, x−i) =
∂π
∂xi
+
∂π
∂r
∂rM
∂xi
= 0. (15)
If W11 is negative at this solution, the solution characterizes firm i’s best response
to x−i. The optimal choice defines a reaction function. As the enforcement spillover
is sensitive to the enforcement mission (M,μ), so is the reaction function: we write
RMi (x−i). A Nash equilibrium is given by {xM1 , xM2 , . . . xMN } where
xMi = R
M
i (x
M
−i;μ) for all i. (16)
The superscriptM highlights the feature that equilibrium outcome varies with the
enforcement mission.
Given the assumed interiority of the optimal choices at the symmetric equilib-
rium, we have
W1(x
M , xM) = 0. (17)
A suﬃcient condition for uniqueness is that the absolute value of slope of firms’
reaction function is less than unity at any symmetric equilibrium. Formally, letting
W12 be the second-order cross-partial of the function W then |W12| < |W11| is
suﬃcient to ensure uniqueness, and we assume that this condition is satisfied.
Lastly, within a particular mission, the equilibrium outcome is sensitive to the
choice of the parameter μ. Implicit diﬀerentiation of set of first-order conditions
suggests that xM(μ) is increasing (decreasing) in μ if and only if W1μ is positive
(negative).
3.1 Comparing outcomes under alternative missions
We say that two missions are equivalent in terms of their enforcement pressure if
the implied risk of being penalized is equal under the two missions. To formalize
this, consider any two missions, (A,α) and (B, β). The enforcement pressure
under these missions depends parametrically on α and β, and also varies with
firms’ choices x. We ask if, for a given configuration of firms choices, x, there exist
15
values α and β such that the enforcement pressure functions are equi-valued,20 and
propose the following definition.
Definition 1 The enforcement pressure under two missions (A,α) and (B, β) is
equivalent for some profile of firms’ choices, x, if
rA(x,α) = rB(x,β).
We aim to compare outcomes under alternative missions that are equivalent
in terms of their enforcement pressure but diﬀer in their enforcement spillover.
To elaborate, let xA(α) denote the unique equilibrium outcome under mission
(A,α). Consider another mission (B,β), where by suitable choice of parameter
value, rA(xA,α) = rB(xA,β). Now if xB(β) is the unique equilibrium under mis-
sion (B,β), how does outcome xB(β) compare with xA(α)? Indeed, as we consider
only symmetric equilibria, each outcome can be characterized by the choice of the
typical firm under that mission. Our question reduces to: How do we rank xA(α)
and xB(β)?
If the equilibrium outcome is sensitive to enforcement spillovers, it should not
surprise us that missions that diﬀer in enforcement spillovers generate distinct
outcomes even when the enforcement pressure is equivalent. Our aim, then, is to
examine if outcomes vary with the nature of the spillover in a systematic fashion.
We have the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Consider two missions (A,α) and (B, β), with unique symmetric
outcomes xA(α) and xB(β). If these missions are equivalent in terms of enforce-
ment pressure at outcome xA, then if
∂rA(xA,α)
∂x−i
>
∂rB(xA,β)
∂x−i
(18)
it must be that xB(β) > xA(α).
20Of course, two arbitrarily chosen missions could diﬀer so much that such equivalence never
holds, regardless of the values of α, β and x. We confine attention to mission-pairs that are not
inconsistent in this sense. Such a restriction should not trouble the reader.
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A formal proof of this proposition is in the Appendix.21
The Proposition says that, relatively speaking, if a mission generates strong
(positive) enforcement spillover, it serves to enhance the compliance incentives
associated with a given level of enforcement pressure. In the comparison described
in the previous section target-driven missions, which generate positive spillovers,
induced more compliance than budget-driven alternatives with negative spillovers.
Proposition 2 allows for greater generality: it is not restricted to the case where
missions under comparison generate spillovers of diﬀering signs. It is the relative
ordering of enforcement spillovers that is key in determining the relative eﬃcacy of
alternative enforcement missions. As long as enforcement spillovers can be ranked,
so can the outcome: any given level of spending on enforcement will generate
a correspondingly higher level of compliance though missions that have stronger
enforcement spillovers.
In general the size and sign of spillovers will depend upon the combination of
the fundamental elements of the enforcement setting, and the mission according
to which the agency embedded in that setting behaves. This provides for the
notion that particular missions may be particularly suited (be ‘good’) in particular
contexts. Further exploration of these context-specificities provides the basis for
further work.
Alternatively we can fix performance for the purpose of comparison. Corollary
1 highlights the fact that the expected enforcement cost of achieving a partic-
ular compliance outcome is lower for missions that induce positive enforcement
spillovers.
Corollary 1 Consider two missions (A,α) and (B,β) that satisfy the inequality in
(18). Then any given outcome x can be achieved at lower enforcement cost under
mission A than under mission B.
21Note that the proposition requires us to compare the value of the derivatives only at a
specific points (xA,α) and (xA,β) respectively. This provides the weakest necessary condition for
the proposition to hold. In the preceding examples one of these derivatives was positive and the
other negative, so the required inequality held everywhere.
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Proposition 2 and its corollary allow us to assess the eﬃcacy of other missions
too. Consider, for instance, a mission that calls for an inspection of an exogenously-
fixed fraction of firms. By design such missions imply no enforcement spillovers.
However, our argument tells us that this will be dominated, in term of eﬃcacy, by
missions that create positive enforcement spillovers.
Various elements of the enforcement ‘setting’, combined with the mission, will
serve to determine the size and sign of the spillovers (recall Example 1 and Exam-
ple 2 set out in the Introduction). Are inspections sequential? What is the order
of moves between the agency and firms, and amongst firms? Is it inspection that
is costly, or is it the enforcement against a firm shown to be non-compliant absorb
extra resource? Is inspecting a non-compliant firm more costly than inspecting a
compliant one? Does the agency have access to a measure of aggregate compliance
rates in the population (such as an ambient measure of pollution in an environmen-
tal setting) before deciding on the intensity with which to progress a firm-by-firm
inspection/enforcement programme? But amongst this wide set of ways in which
particular enforcement settings might vary the analysis here allows us to under-
stand the principles according to which particular combinations of missions and
enforcement settings can be evaluated — the basis on which we can distinguish
‘good’ ones from less good ones in a particular context.
When characterizing strategic interaction it is natural to think in terms of
strategic complementarity or substitutability, so it is natural to ask how they fit
in with the analysis and results here. (The terminology of strategic substitutes
and complements was introduced by Bulow, Geanokoplos and Klemperer (1985)).
Strictly speaking strategic complementarity and spillover are not the same thing.
Spillovers describe interactions in payoﬀs, while strategic complementarity refers
to interactions in strategies. Mathematically the diﬀerence is straightforward:
spillovers refer to the sign of the partial derivative of one firm’s objective func-
tion with respect to a rival’s choice, while strategic complementarity is determined
by the sign of the second cross-partial derivative of the objective function. In
the particular cases that we have explored — analyzing enforcement/compliance
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games underpinned by stylized inspection ‘technologies’ of various diﬀerent types22
— we have found that negative (positive) spillovers invariably go together with the
non-compliance game played between firms being one in strategic complements
(substitutes). It is intuitive why this should typically be the case, and whilst we
cannot rule out the possibility of the perverse pairing it is straightforward to de-
velop conditions that ensure a correspondence between the two. The Appendix
does so for the examples discussed in Section 2.
4 Conclusions
We have shown that outcomes - actual patterns of compliance achieved - depend
not just on the amount of money spent on enforcement but also on the specific
mission given to the enforcer.
Diﬀerent missions can generate qualitatively diﬀerent types of strategic interac-
tion amongst firms. Those that generate positive enforcement spillovers are prefer-
able to those that generate negative — or positive but smaller — spillovers.23 In
plausible settings this suggests a preference for target-driven missions over budget-
22Not just those reported here, but the numerous others we have experimented with in devel-
oping the framework in this paper.
23The ambiguity of the direction of the spillover — and its sensitivity to the agency’s objective
function — has been noted in the context of a model of tax reporting and verification by Heyes
(2001). He notes (page 224) that: “In Erard and Feinstein (1994) the tax agency is assumed to
have a fixed monitoring budget. Optimal policy involves concentrating verification on low-income
reports, which have a greater chance of being under-reports. An increase in the proportion of
honest taxpayers reduces the fraction of low income reports and makes any such report more
likely to be audited, so an increase in the proportion of taxpayers who are honest has the eﬀect
of encouraging dishonest taxpayers to cheat by less. The honest impose a form of (negative)
externality on the dishonest.” In contrast, in his own model the agency chooses an optimal level
of resource to devote to verification. That level is decreasing in the number of dishonest in
the population (since a reduction in the propensity to dishonest reduces the likelihood that an
inspection will score a ’hit’) such that “... the presence of an additional honest firm induces an
incremental cut in monitoring intensity which advantages the dishonest. Growth in the propensity
to honesty in the population will cause the equilibrium behavior of the dishonest to get worse.”
(Heyes (2001: p. 227)).
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driven ones.
While we have explored strategic linkages through the mission, other features
of enforcement regimes might generate linkages too. Heather Eckert at Alberta
University is using GIS methods to investigate spatial correlations in inspection
patterns. One stylized story to hold in mind there is that an inspector who has rea-
son to drive to locale X to visit some firm may have a tendency to visit other firms
nearby “whilst he is in the neighborhood” (Eckert, personal correspondence).24
The model suggests clear policy principles. In determining missions think about
how alternative missions interact with the particularities of the enforcement setting
to generate strategic inter-dependence amongst regulatory parties. Opt for one
that generates positive such inter-dependences - generate what we might refer to
as ‘races to the top’ (high performance) amongst firms, rather than ‘races to the
bottom’.
The spirit of our enquiry suggests a more fundamental mechanism design prob-
lem: the issue of an optimal mission, and indeed whether delegation of enforcement
activity is optimal.25 We do not address this larger problem in this paper, taking
as given that most enforcement activity is delegated to specialist agencies.
The extent to which better-designed missions can improve the outcome will, of
course, depend upon the setting. It is reasonable to conjecture that the benefits will
be greatest where the number of regulated parties is comparatively small. Indeed
the strategic interaction matters less as the number of firms becomes large (or
as each firm becomes ‘small’ in the formal sense) — the type of mission matters
more in oligopolistic than more competitive sectors. This may further the case
for compartmentalizing the activities of enforcement to a more local level to allow,
with appropriate choice of mission given to local enforcers, firms to be put ‘in
24Decker and Pope (2005) provide empirical evidence from the US that the compliance behavior
of firms is increasing in the compliance behavior of other firms in their sector. This would be
consistent with the notion of strategic complementarity between firms’ compliance behavior when
the enforcement agency has a fixed budget.
25Though it is reasonable to think that in the sorts of setting we are considering delegation is
inevitable — the Prime Minister cannot police every section of highway and every eﬄuent pipe on
his own!
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competition’ with one another.26
In order to focus on the main message we have made a number of simplifying as-
sumptions along the way, and there are a number of directions in which the analysis
might usefully be extended. Firms might be heterogenous in compliance costs (im-
plying asymmetric equilibria), fine levels might be endogenised, inspections might
be less-than-fully informative of the true compliance state of the inspected firm,
and so on. Whilst these would complicate the modeling we would not expect them
to change the basic lessons from the paper.
26‘Local’ could refer to the usual geographical notion or to, for example, a tighter delineation
of enforcement activities by industry or activity. The debate about the appropriate boundaries to
place around the activities of the various regulatory agencies (state versus federal, for example)
has been particularly keen in the US and EU.
21
A Appendix - probably not for publication
A.1 Details of formal arguments in Section 2
Firm i chooses xi ∈ [0, xˆ] to minimize the continuous function
V (xi, x−i) = c(xi) + p(xi)r(xi, x−i).
The solution is interior for a given x−i as long as limxi→0 V1(xi, x−i) < 0 and
limxi→xˆ V1(xi, x−i) > 0, where V1 is the partial derivative with respect to xi. A
suﬃcient condition for the first inequality is that c0(0)+p0(0) < 0. In what follows,
we assume this to hold. An interior minimum must satisfy the first-order condition
V1(xi, x−i) ≡ c0(xi) + p0(xi)r(xi, x−i) + p(xi)
∂r
∂xi
(xi, x−i) = 0.
As c0 < 0 the first-order condition requires that p0r+pr1 > 0 at the optimum where
r1 is the partial derivative of r with respect to xi. If r1 > 0 this requirement is
straightforward. If r1 < 0, we require that
p0
p
> −r1
r
,
or that the elasticity of the penalty function exceed the (absolute value of) elasticity
of the enforcement pressure function with respect to a firm’s own choice.
A suﬃcient condition for this critical point to be a minima is that the second
derivative V11(xi, x−i) be positive. Formally,
V11 = c
00 + pr11 + 2r1p0 + rp00 > 0.
As long as these conditions are satisfied, there exists a well-defined reaction function
Ri(x−i) that represents firm i’s optimal response to the symmetric choices made
by other firms.
Define
V12 = pr12 + p
0r2.
22
The slope of a firm’s reaction function (to the symmetric choice of others) is given
by
dxi
dx−i
=
−V12
V11
.
As V11 > 0 at the minima, the reaction function is upward sloping (a case of
strategic complementarity) if V12 < 0, and downward sloping (strategic substitutes)
if V12 > 0.
At a symmetric Nash equilibrium x∗ = {x∗, x∗, . . . x∗}, we have V1(x∗, x∗) = 0,
or equivalently
c0(x∗) + p0(x∗)r(x∗, x∗) + p(x∗)
∂r
∂xi
(x∗, x∗) = 0.
The equilibrium will be unique and ‘stable’ if the absolute value of the slope of the
reaction function is less than 1. For this we require that |V12| < |V11|.
A.1.1 Target-driven mission
For this case
rt(xi, x−i; τ) =
Nx− τ
Nx
if Nx ≥ τ , and zero otherwise. Recall that firm i minimizes
c(xi) + p(xi)r
t(xi, x−i).
Consider any positive target τ < Nxˆ. If aggregate pollution is within the target τ ,
the probability of inspection is zero, and with c0 < 0 there is an incentive for every
firm to pollute more. In the aggregate, emissions must rise to exceed the target.
Abatement activity on prosecution then restores pollution to the target level. This
establishes interiority of the optimum.
The first order condition for the an interior optimum for the level of emissions
is
c0 + rtp0 + prt1 = 0.
For Nx ≥ τ , the partial derivative of the enforcement pressure function is
rt1 =
τ
(Nx)2
> 0.
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A suﬃcient second-order condition for a minimum is that
V11 = c
00 + rtp00 + prt11 + 2r
t
1p
0 > 0, where
rt11 =
−2τ
(Nx)3
< 0.
As
prt11 + 2r
t
1p
0 =
2τ
(Nx)2
p
x
∙
p0
p
x− 1
N
¸
,
this holds, at least in the neighborhood of the symmetric equilibrium, if the elas-
ticity of the penalty function is not smaller than 1
N
at that point. We assume this
to be the case. With symmetric choices
V12 = r12p+ r2p
0 =
(N − 1)τ
(Nx)2
p
x
∙
p0
p
x− 2
N
¸
,
using the facts that rt2 = (N−1)rt1 > 0 and r12 = (N−1)rt11. Thus, V12 is positive
— a case of strategic substitutes — as long as the elasticity of the penalty function
is greater than 2
N
.
A symmetric equilibrium under this mission is given by (xt, xt), where
c0(xt) + p0(xt)rt(xt, xt) + p(xt)
∂rt
∂x
(xt, xt) = 0.
The requirement for uniqueness and stability, that |V11| > |V12|, amounts to
c00 + p
−2τ
(Nx)3
+ 2
τ
(Nx)2
p0 + (1− τ
Nx
)p00 > p
−2(N − 1)τ
(Nx)3
+
(N − 1)τ
(Nx)2
p0.
This holds if c00 + (1 − τ
Nx
)p00 is suﬃciently large relative to the elasticity of the
penalty function.
It is easy to check that the equilibrium level of non-compliance is increasing in
τ . A semi-formal proof runs as follows.27 The shift in a reaction function Ri(x−i, τ)
when τ changes is given by
dRi(τ)
dτ
= −V1τ
V11
.
27A formal proof requires us to solve N equations, each representing the total diﬀerential of a
first-order condition. This is straightforward to check but tedious to report.
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We have V11 > 0, so that the Rti(τ) is increasing in τ if and only if V1τ is negative.
V1τ = p
0rτ + pr1τ =
1
Nx
p
x
∙
−p
0
p
x+
1
N
¸
.
V1τ is negative if the elasticity of the penalty function exceeds 1N , which we have
assumed above. An increase in τ shifts the reaction function outwards. At any
symmetric equilibrium (xt(τ), xt(τ)), it must be that xt(τ) is increasing in τ .
A.1.2 Budget-driven mission
For this case
rb(xi, x−i,β) =
β
Nk(x)
.
so that
rb1 = −
βk0(x)
[Nk(x)]2
< 0,
and
rb11 = −
β[kk00 − 2(k0)2]
(Nk(x))3
> 0.
The firm i minimizes
c(xi) + p(xi)r
b(xi, x−i).
As long as we assume c0(0) + p0(0) < 0, a firm’s optimal choice is bounded away
from zero. The first-order condition for the an interior optimum is
c0 + rbp0 + prb1 = 0.
As c0 < 0, at the optimum we require rbp0 + prb1 > 0, which implies that
p0
p
>
1
N
k0
k
,
or that the elasticity of the penalty function exceeds 1
N
times the elasticity of the
average enforcement cost function.
A suﬃcient second order condition is that
V11 = c
00 + p00rb + prb11 + 2r
b
1p
0 > 0.
This holds if, say, c00+ rp00 is large enough.
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The firm’s choices are strategic complements if the elasticity of the penalty
function is suﬃciently high. With symmetric choices
V12 = r
b
12p+ r
b
2p
0
must be negative. Using the facts that rb2 = (N − 1)rb1 and rb12 = (N − 1)rb11 > 0
we require
p0
p
> 2
k0
Nk
− k
00
Nk0
.
We assume this to be the case.
The symmetric equilibrium under this mission, {xb, xb, . . . xb}, must satisfy
c0(xb) + p0(xb)rb(xb, xb) + p(xb)
∂rb
∂x
(xb, xb) = 0.
The requirement that |V11| > |V12| amounts to
c00 + p00rb + 2rb1p
0 + rb11p > r
b
2p+ r
b
12p
0
or
c00 + p00rb > (N − 3)rb1p+ (N − 2)rb11p0.
Finally, Rti(β) is decreasing in β if and only if V1β is positive.
V1β = p
0rβ + pr1β =
p
Nk
∙
p0
p
− 1
N
k0
k
¸
,
which is positive by earlier assumptions. An increase in β shifts each reaction
function inwards, so that at symmetric equilibria xb is decreasing in β.
Proof of Proposition 1 : If the symmetric outcome xb(β) obtains under mission
(b, β) with nb(xb,β) inspections, by construction we must have
nb(xb, β)k(xb(β)) ≡ β. (A.1)
Note that, ex-post, after prosecuted firms are brought back into compliance, ag-
gregate pollution falls to [N − nb(xb, β)] xb(β).
Consider τ ∗(β), the target level which under a target-driven mission results in
precisely nb(xb, β) prosecutions, or that
rt(xb, τ ∗(β)) ≡ rb(xb,β), (A.2)
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and let xt(τ ∗) be the outcome under mission (t, τ ∗(β)).
To compare the compliance outcome and enforcement cost under these two
missions, consider the first-order condition (8) with (12) in the text, setting τ =
τ ∗(β) in the former case. Equation (8) for the equilibrium under mission (t, τ ∗) can
be written as
c0(xt(τ ∗)) + p0(xt(τ ∗))rt(xt(τ ∗), τ ∗) + p(xt(τ ∗))
∂rt
∂x
(xt(τ ∗)) = 0. (A.3)
The equilibrium under mission (b, β) must satisfy
c0(xb) + p0(xb)rb(xb,β) + p(xb)
∂rb
∂x
(xb) = 0. (A.4)
Given that p(x) > 0, and that ∂r
t
∂x > 0 >
∂rb
∂x , these conditions are both satisfied
only if
c0(xb) + p0(xb)rb(xb,β) > c0(xt(τ ∗)) + p0(xt(τ ∗))rt(xt(τ ∗), τ ∗). (A.5)
By construction, rb(xb, β) = rt(xb, τ ∗), so that the last inequality requires
c0(xb) + p0(xb)rt(xb, τ ∗) > c0(xt(τ ∗)) + p0(xt(τ ∗))rt(xt(τ ∗), τ ∗). (A.6)
Recall that rt is increasing in x (see (7) in the text), and both c0 and p0 are increasing
(as we assumed c00 > 0 and p00 > 0). The above inequality can hold only if xt(τ ∗) <
xb. In words, the calibrated target-driven mission generates better compliance.
Further, if xt(τ ∗) < xb, then nt(xt(τ ∗), τ ∗) < nt(xb, τ) ≡ nb(xb,β). Also as k(x)
is increasing, we must have
nt(xt(τ ∗))k(xt(τ ∗)) < nb(xb, β)k(xb) = β. (A.7)
In words, the target-driven mission achieves greater compliance at lower enforce-
ment cost. Given that higher enforcement budgets can only deliver better out-
comes, our claim goes through.
A.2 Formal arguments associated with the general model
in Section 3
W (xi, x−i) denotes a typical firm profit when it chooses xi and all other firms make
the symmetric choice x−i; W i1 and W
i
2 are the partial derivatives with respect to
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these arguments. The firm’s profit-maximizing choice of xi ∈ [0, xˆ] is interior if
lim
xi→0
W1(xi, x−i) > 0 and lim
xi→bxW1(xi, x−i) > 0 .
The interior maximum must satisfy the first-order condition:
W1(xi, x−i) =
∂π
∂xi
+
∂π
∂r
∂rM
∂xi
= 0.
A suﬃcient condition for this to be a local maximum is that
W11 ≡
∂2π
∂x2i
+ 2
∂2π
∂r∂xi
∂rM
∂xi
+
∂π
∂r
∂2rM
∂x2i
+
∂2π
∂r2
µ
∂rM
∂xi
¶2
< 0.
At a symmetric Nash equilibrium, where all firms choose the same xi (call it xM),
we have
W1(x
M , xM) = 0 for all i.
Further, uniqueness holds when the cross-partial capturing the eﬀects of a sym-
metric change in all rivals’ choices
W12 ≡
∂2π
∂r∂xi
∂rM
∂x−i
+
∂π
∂r
∂2rM
∂xi∂x−i
+
∂2π
∂r2
∂rM
∂xi
∂rM
∂x−i
is less than W11 for all firms.
Proof of Proposition 2 : As xA(α) = (xAi (α), xA−i(α) ) denotes the symmetric equi-
librium under mission (A,α), xAi must be the optimal response to the xA−i. If so,
xAi satisfies the first-order condition
WA1 (x
A,α) ≡ ∂π
∂xi
(xAi ) +
∂π
∂r
(rA)
∂rA
∂xi
(xA,α) = 0. (A.8)
From the assumed equivalence of enforcement pressure for the missions at xA
rA(xA,α) = rB(xA,β). (A.9)
From the assumed ordering of spillovers, and recalling that the externality is sym-
metric,
∂rA
∂xi
(xA,α) >
∂rB
∂xi
(xA,β). (A.10)
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Given that profit is decreasing in enforcement pressure, (A.8), (A.9) and (A.10)
together imply that
∂π
∂xi
(xAi ) +
∂π
∂r
(rB)
∂rB
∂xi
(xA,β) ≡WB1 (xA,β) > 0. (A.11)
Also, as xB(β) is the equilibrium under mission (B,β),
WB1 (x
B, β) = 0. (A.12)
Relations (A.11) and (A.12) compare the value of the function WB1 at two distinct
points, xA and xB. This function takes the value zero at xB and is positive at xA, so
its total diﬀerential at xB must be positive for dxi = xAi −xBi and dx−i = xA−i−xB−i.
If so
WB11dxi +W
B
12dx−i > 0. (A.13)
The proof of the proposition is by contradiction. If xA(α) > xB(β), we have
dxi = x
A
i − xBi and dx−i = xA−i − xB−i both positive and, by symmetry of the two
Nash equilibria, equal. Recall that W11 is negative and that |W12| < |W11| by
Assumption 1, so that the total diﬀerential is necessarily negative, contradicting
(A.13).
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